![]() ![]() The period from the end of the Cold War to the annexation of Crimea in 2014, during which Russia was largely absent from the Mediterranean, was a departure from a centuries-old involvement there. Russia’s push into the Mediterranean, which has intensified since its military deployment to Syria in 2015, is more than a matter of the ambition to be recognized as a global player but a product of enduring national security requirements, threat perceptions, and economic interests. National Intelligence Council, is a senior fellow and the director of Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program. Rumer, a former national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the U.S. 1 It is impossible to understand Russia’s current posture in the Mediterranean without putting it in this context and the long history of the country’s involvement in the region and retreat from it during the quarter century that followed the end of the Cold War. Europe’s dominant position on the country’s foreign policy agenda is a product of its strategic culture, which is in turn shaped by geography, historical legacy, and an elite worldview that considers the West a threat to the domestic political order. Russia’s strategy in the Mediterranean is an integral part of its strategy for the wider European theater, which has long been the principal arena of its foreign policy triumphs and setbacks. This warrants heightened vigilance but not, as has often been the case, fears that Russia has replaced the United States/NATO as the key power broker in the region. Russia is in the Mediterranean to stay, and its push for a greater naval, air, and land presence and increased political influence will continue as long as it remains locked in a tense standoff with NATO in Europe. The Kremlin may aspire to dominate the Mediterranean one day, but for now its aim is to deny this option to NATO. ![]() While Russia has sought, in fact, to regain its old Cold War footing-and has been skillful and opportunistic in exploiting openings to expand its footprint-it has acted with caution, avoiding undue risks and, most of all, an outright confrontation with the United States. The principal rationale for Russia’s return to the region has been the prospect of a military confrontation in the European theater and concerns about the vulnerability of its southern flank in a conflict with NATO. The systems that make up the bubble are limited in range and in a conflict with NATO would be vulnerable to countermeasures.Ĭontrary to a widespread perception, Moscow’s ambitions in the Mediterranean are more than a matter of its vague pursuit to regain great power status-they are a product of enduring Russian national security requirements. The importance of Russia’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) “bubble” over Syria has at times been exaggerated. Moscow’s posture in the Mediterranean has been largely designed to protect its gains in Syria and defend against the threat that Russian leaders see from NATO land, air, and naval capabilities to the Russian heartland. Given Russia’s limited means, its re-emergence in the region can be considered a success, but its effects should not be exaggerated. It has complicated U.S./NATO planning and operations, and Moscow has developed good relationships with important regional powers. ![]() That said, the Russian military is now a presence to be reckoned with in the Eastern Mediterranean. As much as Russia may aspire to regional domination, it lacks the means to achieve this goal. Russian capabilities in the Middle East and the Mediterranean region are modest, and the Kremlin’s ambitions there are constrained by geography and geopolitics, limited resources, a transactional approach to relationships, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) formidable force posture on its southern flank. ![]() Since Russia’s 2015 intervention in Syria, alarms have been sounded about the Kremlin’s ambitions and military capabilities in the Mediterranean. It is impossible to understand Russia’s current posture in the Mediterranean without viewing it within this larger context and against the backdrop of the country’s centuries-old involvement in the region and retreat from it during the quarter century that followed the end of the Cold War. Europe’s dominant position on Russia’s foreign policy agenda is a product of its strategic culture, which is in turn shaped by geography, historical legacy, and an elite worldview that considers the West a threat to the domestic political order. ![]()
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |